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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO.  43552 
      ) 
v.      ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2012-5592 
      ) 
MEGAN ERIN BAKER,   ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
      ) 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Megan Baker pled guilty to one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.  She received a unified 
sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, but the district court retained jurisdiction.  
The district court placed Ms. Baker on probation after her rider; however, when 
Ms. Baker violated the terms of her probation, the district court revoked probation.     
On appeal, Ms. Baker contends that the district court abused its discretion in 




Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 On December 26, 2011, Megan Baker gave birth to a baby girl, S.B., in Weiser, 
Idaho.  (State’s Exhibit 1, p.3; R., p.52.)  After S.B. was born, Ms. Baker’s urine tested 
positive for THC.1  (State’s Exhibit 1, pp.6-7; R., p.39, 52.)  During a well check visit by 
the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare approximately two weeks later, on 
January 10, 2012, Ms. Baker was questioned about her drug use, and provided a 
sample to be tested for illegal drugs.  (R., pp.39-40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-21.)  When 
interviewed, Ms. Baker admitted to officers that she would test positive for marijuana 
and that she had used methamphetamine twelve days before S.B. was born.  
(R., pp.39-40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, 13-22.)  The sample Ms. Baker provided was positive for 
amphetamines, methamphetamines and THC.  (R., p.40; 10/1/12 Tr., p.8, Ls.15-21.) 
On April 16, 2012, the State charged Ms. Baker with one count of felony 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine and/or amphetamine, and one 
count of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, marijuana. (R., pp.27-28.)  
The State filed a Part II enhancement for a second offense under the Uniform 
Controlled Substances Act as Ms. Baker had a previous conviction, nine years prior, for 
delivery of a controlled substance.  (R., pp.33-34.) 
Counsel for Ms. Baker filed a Motion to Dismiss in which Ms. Baker argued that 
the mere presence of a controlled substance in her system coupled with a vague 
admission cannot amount to a sufficient legal basis to uphold a conviction for 
                                            
1 The record is not clear whether Ms. Baker’s urine tested positive for the substance 
tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”), the active compound in marijuana, or whether it tested 
positive for “Carboxy-THC,” a commonly found marijuana metabolite that is not a drug 
or intoxicating substance.  See Reisenauer v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 145 Idaho 948, 
950-951 (2008).   
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possession of a controlled substance.  (R., pp.39-41.)  After hearing the arguments of 
counsel, the district court denied Ms. Baker’s motion to dismiss.  (R., p.59; 10/1/12 
Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9.)  
Ms. Baker entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of felony possession of 
a controlled substance, preserving her right to challenge the district court’s denial of her 
motion to dismiss on appeal; in exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the 
misdemeanor possession charge and to limit its recommendation to an underlying 
sentence of seven years unified, with three years fixed, and to recommend probation, 
with a period of time in county jail.   (R., pp.60-67, 69-70; 10/15/12 Tr., p.11, L.24 – 
p.13, L.17.)  The district court accepted Ms. Baker’s plea and ordered a substance 
abuse evaluation, a mental health evaluation and a Presentence Investigation (“PSI”).  
(10/15/12 Tr., p.24, Ls.18-23.)  The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven 
years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction over Ms. Baker for a period of up to 
365 days.  (R., pp.72-73; 12/3/12 Tr., p.42, Ls.5-8.)  Ms. Baker filed a timely pro se 
Notice of Appeal.   (R., pp.75-79.)  On appeal, she asserted that the district court erred 
in denying her motion to dismiss, but the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decision 
of the district court in an unpublished opinion, State v. Baker, No. 40613, Unpublished 
Opinion No. 476 (Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2014). 
At the conclusion of the rider program, the district court placed Ms. Baker on 
probation for a period of seven years.  (Limited Clerk’s Record on Appeal (“Supp. R.”), 
pp.13-18.)   
A report of probation violation was filed against Ms. Baker which alleged that 
Ms. Baker had failed to attend/complete programming, smoked methamphetamine, 
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spice and bath salts, changed residence without permission from her probation officer, 
consumed alcohol, and failed to make herself available for supervision.  (Supp. 
R., pp.19-28.)  Ms. Baker admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of her 
probation.  (Supp. R., p.41; 6/22/15 Tr., p.4, L.6 – p.5, L.24.)  Pending her sentencing 
on the probation violations, Ms. Baker was released on bond.  (Supp. R., p.42.)  During 
that period of time, the State filed a motion to revoke bond alleging Ms. Baker failed to 
check in with pretrial services and bond was revoked.  (Supp. R., pp.43-47, 50.)   
The State filed a second motion for probation violation which alleged Ms. Baker 
failed to report to her probation officer, failed to submit to a urinalysis test, failed to 
maintain full-time employment, and failed to allow herself to be supervised.  (Supp. 
R., pp.52-56.)  Pursuant to negotiations with defense counsel, the State agreed to 
withdraw the second motion for probation violation.  (Supp. R., p.61.)  In exchange, the 
defense agreed to stipulate to a prison sentence, not to ask for bond, and agreed to 
allow the State to argue the new alleged conduct.  (8/17/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-14; Supp. 
R., p.61.)   
The district court revoked Ms. Baker’s probation.  (Supp. R., pp.63-65.)   
Ms. Baker filed a motion requesting leniency under I.C.R. 35, and she submitted 
a brief in support of the motion.  (Supp. R., pp.66-70.)  That motion was denied without 
a hearing.  (Supp. R., pp.79-80.)  
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Ms. Baker filed a timely Notice of Appeal.  (Supp. R., pp.71-73.)  Ms. Baker 
contends on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by revoking her 
probation.2   
 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Ms. Baker’s probation and 





The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Ms. Baker’s Probation And 
Executed Her Sentence 
 
Mindful that Ms. Baker agreed to be sentenced to prison, Ms. Baker asserts that 
the district court abused its discretion when it revoked her probation and executed her 
original unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed.3  She asserts that her 
probation violations did not justify revoking probation, especially in light of the goals of 
rehabilitation and the fact that the protection of society could be best served by her 
continued supervision under the probation department.   
In light of the significant progress Ms. Baker made while on probation, her 
probation violations did not justify revoking probation.  There are generally two 
                                            
2 Ms. Baker does not assert that the district court erred in denying her I.C.R. 35 motion 
as she did not include new or additional information in support of the motion.  See 
State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (holding “[a]n appeal from the denial of a 
Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the underlying sentence absent 
the presentation of new information.”) 
3 Ms. Baker stipulated to the execution of the previously suspended sentence in 
exchange for the State’s dismissal of the second motion for probation violation.  
(8/17/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-14; Supp. R., p.61.)  Ms. Baker told the district court at 
sentencing that she would like to participate in a therapeutic community program or 
have work center options, and that she was “okay with having [her] time imposed.”  
(10/29/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.9-11.) 
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questions that must be answered by the district court in addressing allegations of 
probation violations: first, the court must determine whether the defendant actually 
violated the terms and conditions of her probation; and second, if a violation of 
probation has been found, the trial court must then decide the appropriate remedy for 
the violation.   State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009).  “The determination of 
whether a probation violation has been established is separate from the decision of 
what consequence, if any, to impose for the violation.”  Id. (quoting State v. Thompson, 
140 Idaho 796, 799 (2004)).  Once a probation violation has been found, the district 
court must determine whether it is of such seriousness as to warrant revoking probation.  
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000).  However, probation may not be 
revoked arbitrarily.  State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989).  The district 
court must decide whether probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether 
probation is consistent with the protection of society.  State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 
529 (Ct. App. 2001).  If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a 
district court’s decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  
I.C. § 20-222; Leach, 135 Idaho at 529. 
Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not 
adequate in a particular situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment, 
deterrence, or the protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has 
made sufficient, genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order.  State v. 
Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Ms. Baker could continue receiving the help she needs to avoid relapsing again 
while she resides in the community, thus the goal of protection of society would be 
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achieved.  Ms. Baker asserts that the district court abused its discretion in finding that 




Ms. Baker respectfully requests that this Court remand her case to the district 
court with an order that she be placed on probation or that her case be remanded to the 
district court for a new probation violation hearing.   
DATED this 18th day of February, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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